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Abstract 
 
A major issue in the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations is 
investor-state dispute resolution as it relates to foreign investments.  The United States would like to have 
strong investor protections similar to those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
included in the TTIP agreement.  Civil society groups on both sides of the Atlantic object to binding 
arbitration of investment disputes, fearing that arbitration awards could endanger environmental and other 
types of regulations.  This paper examines the experience with investor-state dispute resolution under 
NAFTA to determine whether judgments rendered in these cases have had adverse effects.   
 
 
One of the more contentious issues concerning the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) agreement is investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS).  Prior to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), investment issues had not been incorporated into international trade agreements but 
had been handled through bilateral investment treaties.  In the NAFTA negotiations, both the United States 
and Canada wanted assurances of a more predictable and friendly investment climate in Mexico.  Therefore, 
provisions were written into NAFTA’s investment chapter (Chapter 11) providing that companies could 
bring suit against the federal governments of the member countries for damages resulting from actions by 
any level of government that impaired foreign investments made by firms of a member country.  Most 
subsequent trade agreements of the United States,1 and those of several other countries as well, have 
contained such provisions.  This paper surveys the 21-year experience with NAFTA’s investor-state dispute 
resolution procedures to see what lessons can be learned from that experience that might be helpful for the 
TTIP negotiations. 
 
Background of the Investment Provisions of NAFTA 
Adequate protection of investment in Mexico was high on the priority list of both the United States and 
Canada during the NAFTA negotiations.  Investment issues had in the twentieth century been particularly 
sensitive in Mexico.  Resentment of foreign ownership fueled the Mexican revolution in the first part of the 
20th century and led to the nationalization of the petroleum and some other industries.  As recently as 1980, 
Mexico declined membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for fear that GATT rules 
would interfere with Mexico's industrial policies.  Mexico, like most Latin American countries, adhered 
throughout most of the 20th century to the principles of the Calvo Doctrine.  This doctrine provided that 
foreigners involved in investment disputes could not claim the diplomatic protection of their own 
                                                     
1 The US-Australia free trade agreement of 2004 is an exception. 
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government and instead would have their claims adjudicated by local tribunals.  The Mexican Constitution 
provided that a foreign investor attempting to invoke diplomatic protection of their property would thereby 
surrender the property to the Mexican state.  Mexico refused to sign bilateral investment treaties having 
dispute settlement mechanisms that would take adjudication away from local tribunals.   
 During the period of high petroleum prices of the 1970s, Mexico became dependent upon petroleum 
exports for seventy per cent of its export earnings.  Despite inflated export earnings during this period, 
Mexico also was borrowing heavily abroad.  Shortly before leaving office in 1982, Mexican President 
Lopez Portillo nationalized Mexico's banks, causing capital flight from Mexico and a reduced inflow of 
foreign investment.  These effects, combined with a dramatic decline in export earnings from the 
plummeting price of petroleum, created a payments crisis for Mexico in the early 1980s.  The country faced 
the alternative of either defaulting on international obligations or changing its import substitution model to 
a more export-oriented development model that would bring in more foreign exchange.   It chose the latter. 
 As part of this policy change, Mexico began in 1985 to implement a remarkable unilateral trade 
and investment liberalization program.  It dramatically reduced import tariff levels, abolished official 
import reference prices, reduced import licensing requirements, and liberalized foreign investment 
regulations.   Mexico became a contracting party to GATT in 1986, and signed a framework of principles 
and procedures for consultation regarding trade and investment relations with the United States in 1987.   
On a visit to the United States in 1989, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari signed with President George 
Bush a new Understanding Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks agreement.   
 Mexico had hoped, through its economic reform program, to attract more foreign investment to 
help fund its economic development efforts.  It courted potential Japanese investors without much success.  
Western Europe, which had been considered by Mexico a promising source of investment, had become 
distracted by investment opportunities to the east after the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent 
changes in Eastern Europe.  The Mexican administration decided in early 1990 that attracting foreign capital 
would require a strong signal to the world economy that Mexican economic reforms were genuine and 
permanent.  Asking for a free trade agreement with the United States was the most obvious choice.   
 
NAFTA’s Investment Provisions 
Because of Mexico's past investment policies, the investment provisions negotiated in NAFTA were 
extensive and stringent (although each of the NAFTA countries insisted on some exclusions and 
derogations that are spelled out in the agreement). As in the case of most investment agreements, member 
countries agreed to accord investors from other member countries national treatment, i.e., treatment that 
does not in any way disadvantage foreign firms relative to domestic firms in the same industry. Further, 
NAFTA-country firms were entitled to most favored nation treatment, i.e., treatment as favorable as that 
accorded to any other foreign firm in like circumstances. Should the treatment of foreign firms and domestic 
firms differ for some reason, then the NAFTA member countries agreed to extend to NAFTA partner 
country investors the better of national treatment or most favored nation treatment. (McKinney 2000) 
NAFTA-country investors were also to be accorded the minimum standard of treatment in 
accordance with international law, that is, “fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”  
(NAFTA 1992)  This provision is included in investment agreements to guard against substandard treatment 
that would not be ruled out by national treatment or most favored nation treatment, for example, when 
domestic and foreign firms are both treated poorly.  In the early investment disputes arising under Chapter 
11, this provision was used in novel ways to contest alleged non-transparency of governmental processes 
and inconsistencies in the rulings of the agencies of different levels of government.  Consequently, on July 
31, 2001 the North American Free Trade Commission issued a binding Note of Interpretation to clarify the 
parties’ original intent in including this provision.  (Free Trade Commission 2001)  A summary of the US 
position on the issue mentions that the provision refers to such matters as providing  investments with “…a 
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minimum level of police protection against criminal conduct” and that States “… grant aliens access to their 
courts and administer their judicial systems in a manner consistent with international law.”  (Thornton 2012) 
  In addition to the investment protections listed above, Chapter 11 of NAFTA enjoins certain actions 
of member countries with respect to partner country investors. In general, it forbids governments from 
requiring foreign firms to export a portion of their output or to engage in trade balancing. Also, foreign 
firms cannot be required to use a certain percentage of local content or to give preference to domestic 
sourcing. Likewise, foreign investors cannot be required to transfer technology as a condition of foreign 
investment.  Member country governments must not restrict conversion of the local currency at prevailing 
market rates and must allow repatriation of profits. Partner country firms must not have their property 
expropriated, either directly or indirectly, without fair compensation. 
 A particularly contentious provision of Chapter 11 is Article 1110 dealing with expropriation and 
compensation.2  The article prohibits not only direct expropriation without adequate compensation, but also 
indirect expropriation, i.e., measures “…tantamount to nationalization or expropriation…”  (NAFTA 1992)  
Companies have argued that actions of government such as changes in environmental regulations have, by 
reducing the profits that they expected to earn when the foreign investment was initially made, amounted 
to indirect expropriation of their property.  This has been viewed as a possible threat to the regulatory 
prerogatives of governmental agencies, or at least to have a chilling effect on the strengthening of 
regulations, because of the possibility of having to compensate corporations claiming damages from the 
effects of regulatory changes. 
 
Arbitration of Investment Disputes 
The investment chapter of NAFTA is the only part of the agreement that provides direct private party access 
to dispute settlement via binding arbitration.  According to the provisions for investor-state dispute 
settlement as spelled out in the chapter, aggrieved parties are required first to try settling the dispute through 
consultation and negotiation. If that process is not successful, the investor is required to give notice of intent 
to ask for an arbitral panel at least ninety days ahead of doing so.  The member countries have agreed to 
submit unresolved disputes to binding arbitration.  As a condition of submitting the dispute to an arbitral 
panel, the aggrieved party must agree in writing to waive the right to pursue the matter through other 
avenues after it has requested panel arbitration.  It is noteworthy, however, that this waiver provision has 
not always been enforced. 
For an investment case to be eligible for panel arbitration, the investor must file the case within 
three years of the alleged infringement of the NAFTA agreement terms, and must claim to have suffered 
direct loss or damage as a result of the infringement.  
The arbitration panel consists of three persons.  Each of the disputing parties appoints one arbitrator, while 
the third, who serves as chair of the panel, is appointed by mutual agreement of the parties.  The decision 
                                                     
2 Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation  
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its 
territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), 
except:  
(a) for a public purpose;  
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;  
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and  
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6. (NAFTA 1994) 
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rendered by an arbitral panel is automatically enforceable in the domestic courts of the country involved. 
(McKinney 2000) 
  No transparency requirements are specified in NAFTA concerning Chapter 11 cases, and 
consequently information about them was at first difficult for the public to obtain.  Theoretically, 
governments could have settled disputes and compensated the complaining parties without any public 
notification. This lack of transparency proved to be quite controversial, so in its Notes of Interpretation of 
Certain Chapter 11 Provisions on July 31, 2001 the Free Trade Commission made clear that there was 
“…no general duty of confidentiality…” and further stated that each country would “…make available to 
the public in a timely manner all documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal…” except 
for confidential business information or privileged information protected by domestic law of either country. 
(NAFTA Free Trade Commission 2001) Consequently, information about the investor-state dispute 
settlement cases of NAFTA is generally available to the public.   
 In cases that proceed to arbitration, the complaining party may choose to have the dispute settled 
according to either the World Bank’s International Council for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Convention (ICSID), the Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID, or the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law Arbitration Law Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL).  Since neither Canada nor 
Mexico has subscribed to the ICSID Convention, in effect the choice is between the Additional Facility 
Rules of the ICSID and UNCITRAL.  The NAFTA Secretariat plays a very limited role in the process, 
simply maintaining a register of Notices of Arbitration and holding some documents for the record. (Bogule 
and Alston 1999)  
 
NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases and Claims Against the United States 
 
As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, during the twenty-one years that NAFTA has been in effect, 21 cases 
have been filed against the United States, an average of one per year.  Of these cases, 11 have been taken 
to arbitration and two are pending.  Ten of the cases taken to arbitration were dismissed (that is, the 
arbitrators ruled against the claimants).  Even though damages in the amount of $2,996 million were 
claimed, no damages have been paid by the US government.  The eleventh case was part of a multifaceted 
softwood lumber case that was being pursued in other venues through NAFTA and World Trade 
Organization trade remedy provisions.  The case was eventually settled by a new Softwood Lumber 
Agreement that specified rules for softwood lumber trade between the US and Canada for several years, 
and provided that most of the antidumping and countervailing duties inappropriately collected by US 
customs authorities from Canadian lumber producers would be returned to them.   
 
Table 1 
NAFTA Cases and Claims against United States 
 
Cases Filed Cases Taken to 
Arbitration 
Cases Pending Cases Dismissed Cases Damages 
Paid 
21 11 2 10 0 
 
Table 2 
For Cases against United States Taken to Arbitration 
 
Damages Claimed Damages Awarded 
$2,996 million $0 
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Source: Calculated by author from information in (Public Citizen, 2015) 
 
 
Of the two pending cases against the United States, in one of them the Mexican trucker’s 
association CANARA is claiming damages of $30 billion from the failure of the US to allow Mexican 
truckers nationwide access as agreed in NAFTA.  This case is likely to be dismissed by the arbitrators 
because the only investment in the US claimed by those filing the case is certification fees paid to the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.  The case is simply an additional way of putting pressure on 
the US government to live up to terms agreed in NAFTA for trucking access to the US market.  The claimant 
in the other pending case is Mexican cement company CEMEX, which is involved in a lawsuit with the 
state of Texas for alleged failure to pay royalties on minerals extracted from state-owned land.  This case 
was filed by CEMEX in hopes of indemnifying itself against possible losses in the lawsuit (Public Citizen 
2015). 
NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases and Claims Against the Canada 
 
As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, considerably more Chapter 11 cases have been filed against Canada than 
against the United States, a total of 36.  Of these, 11 have been taken to arbitration and 9 are pending.  Of 
the cases taken to arbitration, 4 have been dismissed and damages have been paid in 6 others.  A total of 
$169.4 million in damages have been paid by the Canadian government, about 9% of the $1,877.1 million 
of damages claimed.   
 
 
 
Table 3 
NAFTA Cases and Claims against Canada 
 
Cases Filed Cases Taken to 
Arbitration 
Cases Pending Cases Dismissed Cases Damages 
Paid 
36 11 9 4 6 
 
 
Table 4 
For Cases against Canada Taken to Arbitration 
 
Damages Claimed Damages Awarded 
$1,877.1 million $169.4 million 
 
Source: Calculated by author from information in (Public Citizen 2015) 
The earliest case in which Canada paid damages was filed by Ethyl Corporation asking for $250 
million for damages and compensation arising from a Canadian trade restriction banning the importation 
of MMT (methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl), an octane enhancer that is added to gasoline.  
MMT was not being produced in Canada, but substitute products were.  Ethyl Corporation contended that 
the ban on MMT discriminated against the company in favor of producers of substitute products, and 
therefore violated Chapter 11’s most favored nation provisions. Ethyl also claimed that since banning the 
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additive reduced its business in Canada by about 50%, the effects on its goodwill, assets and expected 
earnings were the equivalent of indirect expropriation.  (Public Citizen 1999) 
  One of the ingredients in MMT is manganese, and studies have indicated that manganese poisoning 
can cause serious neurological problems.  Since no studies had been conducted specifically on the health 
effects of MMT, the use of MMT could not be banned under Canadian environmental laws.  Because MMT 
was not produced in Canada, the Canadian government attempted to deal with the possible health risk by 
banning the importation and inter-provincial trade of MMT.  Ethyl claimed that the ban constituted an 
illegal performance requirement in that it would force the company to build a factory in every Canadian 
province in order to service the market. (Public Citizen 1999) 
  This case was never ruled on by the arbitration panel, but was settled out of court. In the final 
settlement of the case, the Canadian government withdrew the legislation that banned imports of MMT, 
wrote a letter stating that MMT had no proven adverse effects on the environment or on public health, and 
paid Ethyl Corporation $13 million.  It is noteworthy that, through a combination of legal and voluntary 
restrictions, MMT has been eliminated from gasoline in the US and Canada because of public health 
concerns.  (Minjares 2012). 
A second case in which the Canadian government paid damages was filed by S. D. Myers, Inc., a 
toxic waste disposal company in Ohio, which claimed losses of $30 million from an export ban imposed 
by the Canadian government on PCB (polychlorinated biphenal) waste from 1995 to 1997.  The ban 
reportedly was imposed by the Canadian government out of concern that PCBs might end up in less 
developed countries where they could not be disposed of properly, and also that disposal standards of United 
States companies were substandard.  S.D. Myers claimed that the action was taken because it was not a 
Canadian company, and that the export ban prevented the company from operating in the same way that a 
Canadian company could have operated.  It claimed further that the regulation was unfair and 
discriminatory, and that the losses suffered from disruption of its operations amounted to indirect 
expropriation. An unusual aspect of this case is that, while it was filed under the terms of NAFTA’s 
investment chapter, S.D. Myers had no investment in Canada at the time that the alleged actions took place.  
Furthermore, at the time that the case was filed, S.D. Myers would not have been permitted to import PCBs 
into the United States because their importation was banned by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency as of July 1997. (Public Citizen 1999)   
 A third case in which the Canadian government paid damages of $0.5 million was filed by Pope 
and Talbot, Inc., a US timber company that is based in Oregon but operates sawmills in British Columbia.  
Pope and Talbot claimed damages of $130 million for the way in which the Canada-United States Softwood 
Lumber Agreement was implemented.  The company claimed that its export quotas under which it could 
export lumber duty free were cut disproportionately as compared to other producers.  While the arbitrators 
ruled against the company on the merits of the case, they awarded a small amount of damages because the 
Canadian government had treated the company rudely in their attempts to verify the company’s compliance 
with the agreement, and therefore had violated NAFTA’s provision for a minimum standard of treatment 
of foreign investors.  (Public Citizen 2015) 
 The fourth case against Canada in which damages were assessed was filed by Mobil Investments 
and Murphy Oil.  These firms challenged new regulations, issued after their investments were made in 
Newfoundland and Labrador oil fields that required oil extraction firms to pay fees to support research and 
development in Newfoundland and Labrador.  The arbitration panel ruled in favor of the companies, saying 
that the new rules amounted to a prohibited performance requirement, and awarded the companies $13.7 
million plus interest of the $60 million of damages claimed.   
 The fifth case in which the Canadian government paid damages was filed by Abitibi-Bowater, Inc., 
a paper-producing company.  This case is unusual in that the company is actually headquartered in Canada, 
but is also incorporated in Delaware and filed as a foreign investor on those grounds.  The company charged 
that the government of Newfoundland and Labrador had expropriated its water and timber rights, and its 
equipment, after it shut down a paper mill that had employed 800 workers.  The provincial government 
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argued that the rights were contingent on continued operation of the plant.  The government of Canada 
agreed to pay Abiti-Bowater $122 million of the claimed $465.7 in damages to settle the case.  (Public 
Citizen 2015) 
 The final case in which the Canadian government paid compensation was filed by St. Mary’s 
VCNA, a Brazilian company with a subsidiary in the US that owns a Canadian subsidiary.  The company 
was seeking to conduct rock quarrying operations in Canada, and claimed $275 million in damages from 
delays in the permitting process by subfederal government agencies in Canada.  There was some question 
about the validity of the company’s use of NAFTA provisions in view of its minimal business activities in 
the US.  Nevertheless, the government of Canada agreed to settle the case by paying the company $15 
million dollars.  (Public Citizen 2015)  
 Nine cases are pending against Canada, almost as many as the total number either dismissed or for 
which Canada paid damages.  These cases involve a variety of issues: an American mining company is 
claiming damages arising Canada’s environmental regulations that limit its mining in Nova Scotia; the 
owner of a major international bridge is claiming damages from a Canadian law that imposes safety and 
security measures on international bridges; a US-based energy company is challenging the buy local 
provisions of an Ontario province green jobs program; a US-based wood pulp company is claiming 
discrimination by the government of British Columbia in the setting of electricity rates; a US-based energy 
company is protesting its inability to participate in Ontario’s green energy program; a US-based 
pharmaceutical company is challenging Canada’s patent standards; a US-based oil and gas exploration and 
production company is challenging the province of Quebec’s moratorium on the practice of hydraulic 
fracturing; a group of US investors who own a logging company in Canada are claiming discrimination 
because of exclusion from a tax break that the province of Ontario extends to Canadian firms engaging in 
sustainable harvesting; and a US-based oil corporation is seeking damages for the requirement that oil 
producing firms in Newfoundland and Labrador contribute to research and  development funds (the same 
issue as in the Mobil Investments and Murphy Oil case discussed above.)  (Public Citizen 2015) 
NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases and Claims Against the Mexico 
 
As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, a total of 22 Chapter 11 cases have been filed against Mexico.  Of these, 
11 have been taken to arbitration, and two are pending. Six of the cases taken to arbitration have been 
dismissed, while damages have been paid in 5 of them.  The $189 million of total damages paid amount to 
about 13% of the $1,441 million in damages claimed.  
 
 
Table 5 
NAFTA Cases and Claims against Mexico 
 
Cases Filed Cases Taken to 
Arbitration 
Cases Pending Cases Dismissed Cases Damages 
Paid 
22 11 2 6 5 
 
Table 6 
For Cases against Mexico Taken to Arbitration 
 
Damages Claimed Damages Awarded 
$1,441 million $189 million 
 
Source: Calculated by author from information in (Public Citizen, 2015) 
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 In the first case in which Mexico paid damages, Metalclad Corporation sought $90 million in 
damages because Mexican state and local governments prevented Metalclad’s re-opening a hazardous 
waste landfill that it had purchased in the community of Guadalcazar in the state of San Luis Potosi.  After 
Metalclad had invested in the facility, the government reportedly discovered that the landfill had the 
potential to damage underground streams and, consequently, declared the area an environmental zone and 
refused to allow the landfill to be re-opened.  Metalclad claimed that the change in zoning was equivalent 
to expropriation or indirect expropriation of their property. (Public Citizen 1999)   Metalclad was awarded 
$16.2 million in damages, the award was upheld by a British Columbia court in May 2001, and Mexico’s 
Economy Ministry paid the compensation in October 2001. (BRIDGES 2001)  The arbitrators’ decision in 
this case has been criticized as placing on the Mexican federal government an obligation to ensure 
consistency in the advice given by authorities at different levels of government in Mexico.  (Public Citizen 
2015) 
 A second case in which damages were assessed involved Feldman Karpa, a US cigarette exporter, 
who claimed discrimination because the Mexican government had refused to give an export tax rebate that 
had been extended to Mexican firms.  The panel awarded $1.9 million of the $50 million of damages 
claimed.  (Public Citizen 2015) 
 The other three cases in which the Mexican government paid damages all dealt with the same issue.  
The first was filed by Corn Products International, a producer of high fructose corn syrup, claiming damages 
of $325 million from a tax imposed on beverages sweetened with high fructose corn syrup but not those 
sweetened by cane sugar.  Mexico claimed that the tax was a countermeasure to US failure to open its 
market to cane sugar as agreed in NAFTA.  The arbitration panel ruled that such countermeasures were not 
applicable to investor-state disputes, and that beverages sweetened by cane sugar and with high fructose 
corn syrup were close substitutes for each other. They therefore awarded $58.4 million in damages,   In 
separate cases dealing with the same issue, Archer Daniels Midland was awarded $37 million of a claimed 
$100 million in damages, and Cargill Corporation was awarded $90.7 million of $100 million of claimed 
damages.  (Public Interest 2015)  It is curious that these cases were not consolidated since they dealt with 
exactly the same issue, and that the awards ranged from 18% of the damages claimed in the Corn Products 
International case to 91% in the Cargill Corporation case.   
 The two pending cases against Mexico involve a US defense and energy contractor claiming 
damages in a dispute with Mexico’s national oil company, PEMEX, and a group of US investors claiming 
interference of the Mexican government by its forcing closure of casinos in which they have a business 
interest.  (Public Interest 2015) 
 
Lessons for the TTIP Negotiations from NAFTA Experience with ISDS 
 
A major concern to those opposed to the inclusion of investor-state dispute resolution in trade agreements 
is that, in an effort to improve the certainty of investment decisions for corporations, the procedure may 
increase uncertainty for regulators and administrative agencies charged with protecting the public interest.  
The notion that a change in a government regulation which reduces the expected profits of a corporation 
can be considered “tantamount to expropriation” has been particularly controversial.  The specter of 
governments being assessed large sums to compensate corporations for having changed regulations to 
protect the public interest has caused considerable angst.  Civil society groups, particularly in Western 
Europe but also to a lesser degree in the United States, have for this reason been outspoken opponents of 
including ISDS provisions in the TTIP agreement.   
 The experience with ISDS cases under NAFTA should provide some comfort to those who are 
concerned about this issue.  Based on the 21-year experience with NAFTA, only an average of one case per 
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year has been filed against the United States. Of these, 11 have been taken to arbitration, and the US 
government has not been required to pay a single dollar in damages.  Surprisingly, Canada has been the 
target of considerably more cases (36 in total,) of which 11 have proceeded to arbitration.  In 6 of these 
cases Canada has paid damages totaling $169.4 million, about 9% of the damages that claimants were 
seeking.  A total of 22 cases have been filed against Mexico, one-half of which have proceeded to 
arbitration.  Damages awarded have amounted to $189 million, about 13% of the $1.441 damages claimed.   
 In the NAFTA cases for which damages have been awarded, only three of them have claimed 
indirect expropriation of property.  A total of four cases have challenged environmental regulations of the 
countries involved.  In only one case, that of Ethyl Corporation’s case against Canada, was there a possible 
weakening of an environmental regulation, and a combination of legal and voluntary restrictions on the use 
of the chemical in question have successfully eliminated its use.  Two of the cases pending against Canada 
claim damages from changes in environmental regulations—one of them from regulations protecting 
endangered species in Nova Scotia, and the other from Quebec’s placing a moratorium on hydraulic 
fracturing for oil production until the environmental effects of the practice can be studied in more detail.   
(Public Interest, 2015)  Neither of these cases is likely to cause a change in environmental regulations in 
Canada, and their prospects for claiming damages are far from certain.   
 In the context of the massive trade and investment that occur among the countries of North 
America, the number of claims and the damages paid have been relatively insignificant.  It is true that, 
worldwide, ISDS cases have increased significantly in recent years (Economist, 2015), but so has foreign 
investment and the number of increased cases is proportional to the increased investment (Miller and Hicks 
2015).  The number of ISDS cases arising from trade agreement provisions is dwarfed by those arising from 
the many bilateral investment treaties in existence, and by the number of investment disputes that are 
litigated in national courts.  (Weisman 2015)  
 
Conclusion 
 
Some of the ISDS cases have raised fundamental questions concerning the appropriate relationship between 
trade policy and environmental policy, and also about how to provide legitimate protection of property 
rights to foreign investors while at the same time protecting the right of a sovereign state to make and 
enforce policies regulation what goes on within its borders.  Since the ISDS provisions have been so 
controversial, it can reasonably be asked whether they could not be made less controversial.   
 The objection is sometimes raised that ISDS provisions extend protections to foreign investors that 
are superior to those enjoyed by domestic investors, and to an extent that is true.  The rationale for this 
treatment is that foreign firms are often at a disadvantage in host country courts.  Foreign investors need an 
extra measure of assurance that they will be treated objectively and fairly.  And while commercial insurance 
is available for insuring against political risk, its coverage is not as complete as that afforded by ISDS 
arbitration. 
 Steps are beginning to be taken to address the concerns raised about ISDS arbitration.  On the 
matter of transparency in ISDS cases, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law adopted 
Rules of Transparency on 11 July 2013 to go into effect as of 1 April 2014.  In December of 2014, the 
Commission adopted the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration and invited interested countries to sign the Convention.  (United Nations 2015)   
 Recent free trade agreements are taking steps to address other concerns.  For example, the Korea-
Australia free trade agreement states in Annex 11-B:5 that “Except in rare circumstances, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations,” and in Annex 11-E that “Within three years after the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism 
to review awards rendered…”  (KAFTA 2014)  If the loophole “except in rare circumstances” were 
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eliminated and the remainder of the statement in Annex 11-B-5 included in the TTIP, this would go a long 
way toward allaying the fears of those concerning about the threat to domestic regulations from ISDS 
decisions.  And an appellate body such as that envisioned in Annex 11-E would be useful to reconcile 
conflicting decisions on similar issues by different arbitral panels, or to correct mistakes of arbitral panels.   
 By addressing these concerns: transparency, threat to domestic regulations, and the need for 
appellate review, the TTIP agreement has the opportunity to preserve the benefits of ISDS arbitration while 
guarding against unintended costs. 
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